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Dominant designs and platforms are two distinct sci-
entific fields in the analysis of innovation of and compe-
tition between technologies. Responding to calls for 
more synthesis in management research, we study the 
commonalities and differences between the fields sur-
rounding these concepts. To this end, we develop a 
framework for the comparison of concepts and apply it 
to dominant designs and platforms. We show that dom-
inant designs and platforms differ most prominently re-
garding their central mechanisms, their unit and level 
of analysis, and the timeframe. We will elaborate how 
they are complementary by developing a research 
agenda. 
1. Introduction  
Dominant designs and platforms define complex 
technological infrastructures and are linked to distinct 
approaches in studying technological innovation and 
competition. In current days, the term platform enjoys 
great popularity among scholars and practitioners [e.g., 
1, 2, 3]. Dominant designs [4, 5] had their bloom earlier 
[6, 7], eking out a niche existence in current days.  
Platforms are meta-organizations that orchestrate 
loosely coupled parties and facilitate economies of scale 
and scope [1]. Dominant designs are persistent architec-
tures that define core design concepts [8]. Despite their 
lagged development, there is good reason to assume that 
dominant designs and platforms as concepts are at least 
complementary. Both deal with technological innova-
tion that is broadly applicable and used by different ac-
tors for different purposes. These technological innova-
tions are mostly not stand-alone – many actors must 
come together to create a solution that works reasonably 
well across different application domains. The require-
ments of these domains change over time, and so do the 
technological innovations. In studying such innova-
tions, the field of platforms focuses on purposefully 
aligning loosely coupled actors that contribute comple-
mentary products and services towards a central value 
proposition. The field of dominant designs takes an evo-
lutionary perspective in which coordination is achieved 
through settling on a value proposition’s core design 
specifications. These are developed by trial and error in 
different application domains. 
With interest in complementarities at the intersec-
tion of both fields, we first answer the following ques-
tion: What are the systematic differences and common-
alities between dominant designs and platforms? To an-
swer this question, we sketch the fields’ development, 
construct a review framework to systematically com-
pare the fields, and elaborate the differences and com-
monalities. We then integrate the fields and propose di-
rections for future research.  
We find that platforms research focusses on plat-
form-internal coordination and competition between 
platforms and does not explain why platforms emerge. 
Dominant designs thinking focusses on the successive 
dominance of designs, dubbed technology cycle. We in-
tegrate these differences into a research agenda that ad-
dresses platform design and management against the 
context of evolutionary mechanisms on various levels of 
analysis. 
Except for occasional reference to their similarity [2, 9], 
we believe that the question of our paper is unanswered, 
yet very relevant. Managers and scholars of technologi-
cal innovation deal with innovations and systems that 
are not stand-alone, subjected to change over time, and 
catering to different application domains, corresponding 
to the phenomena studied by the fields of platforms and 
dominant designs. While this applies to information and 
communication technologies in as much as to diesel en-
gines, we think that the field of information systems (IS) 
with open and generative systems is particularly ex-
posed to such systems.  
2. Development of the literature 
Dominant designs research emerged from scholarly 
interest in the interaction between organization and en-
vironment [10]. In the 1960s, some economists argued 






that one had to look at the inner workings of technolo-
gies and not only at their performance characteristics in 
order to understand economic change [11]. Scholars 
such as Abernathy, Utterback, and Rosenberg were 
among the first who worked on the opening of the ‘black 
box’ of technology. Dominant design thinking is rooted 
in the observation that technology progresses are based 
on trial and error. When a new product class emerges, 
the technology’s inherent potential and its anticipated 
users’ needs are unknown. Creating different designs 
and introducing them to the market is the only way to 
reduce uncertainty [12], next to the involvement of users 
in the design process [13]. The term dominant design 
was first mentioned by Abernathy and Utterback. A 
dominant design is a specific design of a technological 
innovation that is found to be relatively good across a 
variety of applications and hence is adopted by a large 
portion of the customers. With the emergence of a dom-
inant design, a shift from radical to incremental product 
innovation with more intense price competition and an 
increased focus on process innovation starts. However, 
this phase can have a limited life – it can be disturbed 
by a so-called technology shock, which evolutionary 
economists define as another technology that substan-
tially increases production output [14]. Tushman and 
Anderson [10] distinguish two types of technological 
discontinuities: competence-destroying and compe-
tence-enhancing discontinuities. The former is so essen-
tially different from previously dominant technologies 
that previously essential knowledge is no longer viable. 
The latter refer to order of magnitude improvements in 
performance or price which still build on the previously 
viable knowledge.  
Based on this thought, Anderson and Tushman [6] 
define the technology cycle which is launched by intro-
ducing a technological discontinuity. Thereafter, a 
somewhat chaotic phase emerges in which actors try to 
build up a system around alternative new technologies 
while, at the same time, these technologies do compete 
with each other and the previous dominant technology. 
In this phase, the number of technology variations in 
product class increases, and this phase is referred to as 
the era of ferment. This stage is followed by dominant 
design selection and an era of incremental change, 
which continues until the status quo is disrupted by an-
other technological discontinuity. Empirical studies 
have focused on dominant designs with respect to entry 
and exit patterns [15, 16, 17], firm founding and exits 
[18], and entry with respect to the technology cycle [7], 
amongst others. Strategy scholars were interested in 
strategies for creating dominant designs.  
Platforms research has its roots in network econom-
ics – the studying of industries in which a technology’s 
value is conditional on the number of other users of the 
same technology [19, 20]. Telephones, email, mobile 
phones are examples of pure network technologies, i.e., 
technologies which have close to no standalone value 
[21]. The sum of all users at any given moment is called 
installed base. Network technologies can have specific 
characteristics such as path dependence, which means 
that current design characteristics may depend on some-
what accidental past events yet, once established, are 
difficult to change. For example, David [22] argued that 
today’s QWERTY keyboard layout can be traced back 
to design decisions that may have seemed unremarkable 
at the time. Due to the installed base, firms are kept off 
from making major discontinuous design changes. In a 
formal model, Arthur [23] shows how initial minor de-
sign choices are cemented over time. Path dependence 
often results in positive feedback loops, both increasing 
leads and accelerating declines [24]. If positive feed-
back is strong enough, the market may show winner-
take-all characteristics.  
Since the early start of this millennium, industrial 
economy scholars have started paying attention to plat-
forms, conceptualized as ‘two-sided markets’, [25] 
‘multi-sided markets’ [26], or ‘multi-sided platforms’ 
[27]. Scholars view platforms as intermediaries that fa-
cilitate the interaction between different groups, or so-
called sides of a market. Rochet and Tirole [25] capture 
two-sided markets in a theoretical model as a mixture of 
network economics and multi-product pricing that 
stresses cross-elasticities. Central to this literature is that 
various platforms compete against each other. The 
premise is that users value a platform more the larger its 
number of users is. Next to direct (or same side) network 
effects, two-sided markets are also driven by indirect 
network effects. These occur if “the benefit to users in 
at least one group (side A) depends on the number of 
other users in the other group (side B). An indirect net-
work effect arises if there are cross-group network ef-
fects in both directions (from A to B and from B to A) 
and side B’s participation decision depends on the num-
ber of participants on side A so that the benefit to a user 
on side B depends (indirectly) on the number of users 
on side A” [28:5]. Together, both mechanisms can cause 
the emergence and prevalence of a dominant platform to 
the platform leader’s advantage [29] (dominant plat-
forms are also dubbed focal platforms [30] or estab-
lished platforms [31]). Frequently studied topics are get-
ting “both sides on board” [25:990] while avoiding the 
“chicken and egg-problem” [32]. Often, these problems 
are addressed through pricing and subsidizing one side 
in order to attract the other [25, 33, 34]. 
Meanwhile, organizational theorists studied plat-
forms as technological architectures that help to manage 
complexities [1]. Wheelwright and Clark [35] were the 
first to explicitly mention the term platform, referring to 
products that address core customers’ wants but can be 
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adapted by adding or removing features. This perspec-
tive’s broader theme became the systematic reusing of 
components which facilitated economics of scope in 
production and innovation. Engineering platforms were 
observed to entail a modular technological architecture 
as a commonality [36]. Baldwin and Woodard also in-
troduce the idea of a stable core and a more variable pe-
riphery as characteristics of platforms, highlighting the 
facilitation of innovation as a key function of platforms. 
Empirical studies have focused on platforms across 
firms in supply chains [e.g., 37, 38, 39] but also in more 
extensive networks of firms that are not linked through 
supply chains, called innovation ecosystems or platform 
ecosystems [e.g., 40, 41, 42]. Reviewing both streams, 
Gawer [1] suggested a overarching definition, charac-
terizing platforms as (meta) organizations that federate 
actors, have a modular architecture consisting of a core 
and a periphery, and facilitate economies of scale and 
scope.  
3. Methodology 
To compare the literatures on dominant designs and 
platforms, we (1) selected papers that are representative 
of their respective field, (2) developed a review frame-
work, and (3) qualitatively coded the papers based on 
this framework. 
First, we created a sample of studies by searching for 
dominant designs and platforms (including synonyms) 
on ISI Web of Science. To identify studies that belong 
to the field’s core, we proceeded with the top 500 most-
cited papers. We checked the resulting papers for sub-
stantial fit, removing purely technical papers and those 
that treat platforms and dominant designs only in pass-
ing. Since an absolute citation measure has its down-
sides (e.g., favors older papers, does not account for dif-
ferent citation patterns across disciplines and time [43]), 
we supplemented the sample with papers in the Web of 
Science ‘highly cited paper’ category. The ‘highly cited’ 
indicator takes different citation rates by field and paper 
age into account [44], addressing some of the problems 
of citation numbers as a quality proxy. Based on this 
sample, we create citation, co-citation, and biblio-
graphic coupling maps with the software VOSviewer 
(www.vosviewer.com) to select key papers.  
Second, we developed a review framework to con-
ceptually analyze and distinguish between dominant de-
signs and platforms. It consists of two major parts, 
called positioning (Figure 1, top) and distinguishing fea-
tures (Figure 1, bottom). We now discuss both in more 
detail.  
Distinguishing features forms the framework’s core 
and is based on an cause-mechanism-output framework, 
inspired by similar studies that have used this structure 
to define concepts [45, 46, 47]. It contains the aspects 
cause, mechanism, contrast, complementary aspects, 
and outcome. Each of these aspects can be used (alone 
or in combination) to define a concept. For example, a 
natural disaster is defined as “a sudden and terrible event 
in nature (such as a hurricane, tornado, or flood) that 
usually results in serious damage and many deaths” 
[48]. Here, the outcome is destruction and death, and the 
cause is a terrible event in nature. This definition draws 
on the aspects cause and output, but does not draw on 
the aspects mechanism, contrast, or complementary as-
pects, so that these are left void. Complementary aspects 
and contrast may require more explanation. Definition 
by complementary aspects refers to specification of a 
concept’s complementary components. For example, 
communication appliances can be defined as appliances 
that require an infrastructure. Clarification by contrast 
relates to discriminant validity which ensures that one 
construct can be empirically distinguished from similar 
constructs and that aspects unrelated to the construct can 
be indicated [49].  
What we summarize under positioning is related to 
the boundaries based on assumptions that constrain the-
ory [49]. It is implicitly evident that contextual factors 
[e.g., 50], and the disciplinary background [e.g., 1, 51] 
are used to structure reviews. Therefore, we divide po-
sitioning into the aspects perspective, discipline, and 
context (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Review framework 
Third, we analyzed relevant papers based on the 
framework in a qualitative way. As a first step, the first 
and third authors assigned papers to the streams of dom-
inant designs and platforms. Cases of disagreement 
were solved via discussion. To judge a paper’s position-
ing, we used the following guidelines. A research pa-
per’s perspective is judged based on the problem owner 
of the research problem, the unit of analysis, and the 
level of analysis. The problem owner and the role are 
inferred from the practical implications presented in the 
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paper. The level of analysis concerns the level or gran-
ularity of the research, whereas the unit of analysis re-
fers to the entity or actor that is studied [52]. Both unit 
and level of analysis are used in other frameworks to 
structure literature reviews, e.g., [53]. Often, the disci-
plinary background is explicitly mentioned, for example 
in Gawer’s [1] review covering the engineering and eco-
nomics perspective on platforms, as already mentioned 
in the abstract. In other cases, we preferably infer this 
information from the theory used in the article due to the 
field’s interdisciplinary nature. The analysis of distin-
guishing features started by analyzing definitions of the 
key concepts dominant designs and platforms. Only af-
ter extracting information from the definitions (if pre-
sent) did we look at the remainder of the paper.  
4. Analytical results 
Table 1 presents the outcome of the analysis of key 
papers in condensed form with respect to the framework 
presented above. 
4.1. Analysis of Distinguishing features  
4.1.1. Analysis of causes. The analysis of causes of 
dominant design selection revealed no consensus in the 
literature. According to Abernathy and Utterback [4], 
users are assumed to play a major role in the selection 
of a dominant design as their understanding of perfor-
mance requirement is more intimate, leading them to 
make ‘suggestions’ with respect to the consequent ver-
sion of that innovation. As this research is framed from 
the perspective of firms (and seemingly dissociate from 
consumers), suggestions by users likely take the form of 
purchase decisions. This, in turn, would imply that dom-
inant design selection is installed-base driven. Anderson 
and Tushman [6] argue that dominant designs emerge 
from radical innovation as a consequence of efforts by 
manufacturers, customers, suppliers, and regulators to 
decrease uncertainty, which is common with many of 
the reviewed studies. Furthermore, market demand, 
market power by leading producers, and first mover ad-
vantage are mentioned as possible causes of a dominant 
design [6], as well as various economic and organiza-
tional factors, such as the possession of collateral assets, 
industry regulation, government intervention or mana-
gerial strategic action [15]. Constant [54], in his descrip-
tion of the jet-powered airplane, maintains that the dom-
inant design, although not optimal in specific applica-
tions, was the design with the best performance across a 
wide variety of applications. Schilling [55] writes that 
dominant designs emerge in situations of extreme path 
dependency. Gallagher [8] suggests that dominant de-
signs are triggered by radical innovation. 
In contrast, many seminal papers offer no cause that 
triggers the emergence of a platform [25, 40, 50]. For 
engineering platforms, Gawer’s [1] review suggests 
complexity as a condition for modularity. Hence, com-
plexity could be seen as a condition for platforms to 
arise. The economics perspective on (multi-sided) plat-
forms assumes the pre-existence of different sides with 
a need for interaction that the platform facilitates in the 
form of a conduit, presumably lowering transaction 
costs. Recent advances in ecosystem theory, although 
different from the economics perspective, suggest that 
ecosystems emerge in response to a “need for coordina-
tion that cannot be dealt with in markets”, enabled by a 
modular design [51:2260]. These examples, however, 
create the impression of necessary conditions rather than 
sufficient conditions for platform emergence, which is 
no surprise as platforms come into existence based on 
managerial action [9]. 
Key distinction: Neither of the streams has settled on 
what causes their phenomenon to emerge. In both dom-
inant design research and the economic perspective on 
platforms, installed base plays a role as a cause. Radical 
innovation is only mentioned with respect to dominant 
designs. Contrarily, platforms do not simply emerge 
without firm-level agency [9]. That means that plat-
forms are deliberately created by firms in contrast to 
dominant designs that emerge in the market because of 
the collective action of many firms and other actors. In 
both streams, complexity plays a role. Modularity as a 
condition is mentioned only in platforms research.
Table 1. Commonalities and differences between dominant designs and platforms  
 Dominant Designs  Platforms 
Definition Prevalent architectures that define a set of core design 
concepts 
 (Meta) organizations facilitating economies of scale and 
scope, modular architecture 
Discipline (Evolutionary) economics, (innovation) management  (engineering/ strategic) management, network economics,  
Problem owner Manager  Platform leader, manager  
Unit of Analysis Technological design architecture  Meta-organization, platform, ecosystem 
Level of analysis Industry, product class  Ecosystem, product family, central value proposition 
Context High-tech manufacturing (e.g., automotive) / ICT  ICT / consumer electronics 
Start situation Alternative / competing technological design   Unspecified 
Cause Radical innovation  largely unspecified 
Mechanism Emergent, demand-driven competition, sometimes 
network effects, learning effects 






Not necessarily technologically superior, mostly non-
proprietary 
 Ecosystems: not fully hierarchically controlled 
Complementary 
aspects 
Production, maintenance, and repair equipment, en-
force / embody standards 
 Modular architecture, composed of core and periphery, 
complementary products and services that utilize the core 
Outcome Variety reduction, uncertainty reduction, economies of 
scale, shift to component-level innovation,  
 Value co-creation, intermediation 
 
4.1.2. Analysis of mechanisms. The selection pro-
cess of a dominant design is described as emergent [56] 
or evolutionary [57]. Abernathy and Utterback [4] give 
no information about the mechanism’s operational 
mode. Suarez and Utterback [15] emphasize that tech-
nological factors alone may not suffice to explain dom-
inant design selection, as the dominant design is not nec-
essarily the design with the highest technological per-
formance. Bandwagon effects and network may also 
play a role. Anderson and Tushman [6] are not very spe-
cific with regard to the mechanism behind dominant de-
sign selection – they describe it as emergent from de-
mand-driven competition. Also, here, it is implied that 
dominant design selection is installed-base driven. That 
means that the design with the largest installed base is 
selected as the dominant design. The introduction of the 
technology cycle makes an essential point regarding the 
duration of mechanisms, suggesting that it is a recurring 
and ongoing process. Schilling [55] posits that increas-
ing returns to adoption, pressure for compatibility, and 
government regulation may lead to the selection of a 
dominant design. Network effects, however, are not 
necessary for the emergence of a dominant design [8]. 
A design can be selected as the dominant design simply 
because it is the better product, scoring higher on the 
price-performance-ratio. 
The mechanisms of platforms, on the other hand, 
have received much more attention. Fascinated by the 
prospect of monopoly profits, much research addressed 
how the dominance of platforms. Van Alstyne et al. [58] 
write that network effects drive platforms' power and 
success. Dominance aside, platforms (and their ecosys-
tems) have been contrasted based on internal coordina-
tion mechanisms. As shown in section 4.1.1., a need for 
coordination that exceeds the potential of markets is a 
condition for platforms to arise. Gawer [1] calls this co-
ordination mechanism ‘ecosystem governance’ which is 
done based on pricing in the case of multi-sided plat-
forms, however, without specifying what it would entail 
otherwise. In comparison with other network forms, 
Jacobides et al. [51] stress that ecosystems are not fully 
hierarchically controlled, meaning that ecosystems must 
rely on control mechanisms other than managerial hier-
archy. Ecosystems are bound together by the character-
istic that the collective investment cannot be recovered 
or redeployed elsewhere.  
The provision of tools and resources, or the re-use of 
components is an often-mentioned feature of platforms 
that can be placed between dominance-related mecha-
nisms and internal coordination mechanisms [e.g., 1, 59, 
60]. The systematic re-use of components allows for 
economies of scope in production. Economies of scope 
are present when the joint production of goods is 
cheaper than the individual production of goods [61].  
Key distinctions. The analysis shows that, in the field 
of platforms, two types of mechanisms are analyzed: 
Mechanisms leading to the dominance of platforms, and 
on the other hand, internal coordination mechanisms. 
Platforms and dominant designs, hence, relate differ-
ently to the notion of dominance. There is scope for a 
platform in the absence of dominance (in fact, this is 
how many platforms have grown, e.g., Facebook in its 
early days) as it can successfully and persistently serve 
a niche, and several platforms can exist next to each 
other, see the video game console market. Here lies a 
key difference with a dominant design which “is simply 
one among many different ‘design approaches’” [8:272] 
in the absence of dominance. Furthermore, the common 
denominator regarding the mechanism behind dominant 
design selection is that it is demand-driven, while some 
authors describe it as evolutionary or do not reference to 
mechanisms at all. This contrasts with research plat-
forms where mechanisms have received much attention. 
With dominant designs, coordination occurs by settling 
on a dominant design, meaning by choice of technology 
alone. Besides, dominant design selection mechanisms 
cover different tie spans – selection is recurring or on-
going, whereas platforms’ mechanisms potentially lead 
to the prevalence of one dominant platform. The idea 
that different platforms may take their turns in being 
dominant has not been described.  
4.1.3. Analysis of outcomes and complementary 
aspects. Many dominant design studies define dominant 
designs as an outcome. Abernathy and Utterback [4] de-
scribe innovation patterns ajar empirical observations in 
the semiconductors, aircraft, electronics, and automo-
tive industries. The development of a dominant design 
is seen as “the shift from radical to evolutionary product 
innovation” [4:6]. This means that a state of evolution-
ary product innovation is reached once the development 
of a dominant design is concluded. This early concept 
of a dominant design is common with many other stud-
ies, some of which characterize a dominant design as re-
ducing variation and uncertainty in a product class [6], 
or the shift of technology development at the component 
and process level [7]. Another frequently mentioned 
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outcome is economies of scale by enforcing standardi-
zation [6, 15]. This causal chain, however, is not shared 
by all studies – even though still defined as the outcome, 
Henderson and Clark [56] see a dominant design as 
emergent from the opportunity to obtain economies of 
scale (with reference to David [22] and Arthur [23]). 
Constant [54] claims that dominant designs also emerge 
as result of economies of scope because he describes the 
design as the best compromise in a range of applica-
tions. Apart from that, this article lays the foundation of 
many other views on dominant designs by introducing 
architectural innovation and by defining a dominant de-
sign in this light. Here, a dominant design manifests in 
the stabilization of architectural knowledge which then 
becomes encoded and implicit. Architectural knowledge 
concerns the links between components rather than the 
components themselves [56:11]. An architectural inno-
vation alters how a product’s components are related to 
each other without affecting the knowledge underlying 
the components [56:10]. The idea of architectural 
knowledge takes a central place in later studies, such as 
Christensen et al. [7] who operationalize dominant de-
signs based on architectural configurations, or Gal-
lagher [8:374] who portrays dominant designs as “per-
sistent architectures”. The emergence of such a persis-
tent architecture usually accompanied by a convergence 
of design attributes [8].  
Whereas dominant designs are often defined as an 
outcome, platforms research frequently draws on both 
outcome and complementary aspects to define the cen-
tral concept. A notable definition in this respect is the 
one by Van Alstyne et al. [58] who explicitly mention 
platform owner, platform provider, producers, and con-
sumers as the constitutive agents of a platform, and that 
platforms have an ecosystem. Papers that address the 
outcome in their definition of platforms mention the re-
sulting network of producers and consumers [58], the 
stimulation of value co-creation [50, 60], intermediation 
[25], and economies of scale respectively scope [59]. 
Jacobides et al. [51] describe the existence of an ecosys-
tem as obviating the need for custom contractual agree-
ments with each partner. 
Key distinction: The concept of core and peripheral 
systems that implies modularity is typical of dominant 
designs and platforms. Whilst most definitions across 
dominant designs and platforms draw on outcomes, 
there is a subtle difference regarding their recognition. 
In contrast to platforms, dominant designs can only be 
recognized in retrospect based on subjective guidelines 
[8]. This counts for earlier definitions (based on a shift 
from radical to incremental innovation), but also newer 
definitions based on architecture. Further, dominant de-
signs are the best compromise in a range of applications. 
Moreover, some platform studies explicitly mention the 
actors that together comprise a platform ecosystem, 
something that is not typical of dominant design studies.  
4.2. Positioning 
The analysis showed that most studies across both 
fields address managers as the problem owners. Much 
of platform research is written from the viewpoint of a 
platform leader or platform owner. Notable exceptions 
are studies on dominant designs that do not include 
agency of some sort but that implicitly address policy 
makers based on the choice of variables [22, 23]. Dom-
inant design research predominantly studies the techno-
logical design or architecture in some variation as unit 
of analysis. Sometimes, the technological architecture is 
studied together with the production process [4], or in 
combination with the firm [7, 15, 57]. These are mostly 
studied against the respective industry or product class 
as a level of analysis [e.g., 6, 8, 15, 56]. Across domi-
nant design studies, we see that the technology and their 
industry / product class background are central. Most 
studies on platforms have the platform leader / keystone 
firm as a unit of analysis [1, 25, 58]. Ecosystem research 
pays more attention to the locus of technological chal-
lenges [40] or the attraction of complementors [59]. 
Much of platform research takes place at the level of (in-
dustry) ecosystems [1, 40, 58, 59].  
Both fields’ disciplinary backgrounds are multifac-
eted. Research on platforms draws predominantly on 
technology / strategic / engineering management and 
economics. Dominant design is based in the fields of 
(evolutionary) economics, innovation management, and 
engineering management.  
Regarding empirical contexts, both fields study tech-
nological innovation. Research on dominant designs is 
mostly based in high-tech such as semiconductors or au-
tomotive. Platform research is mostly based in ICT, 
such as mobile apps, PC software, or video games. 
Noteworthy is the vast numbers of theoretical works in 
the domain of economic platforms [e.g., 25, 32, 34]. A 
central theme of dominant design research is the start 
situation. Many studies assume the existence of several 
alternative competing technological designs out of 
which a dominant design is selected [e.g., 6, 8, 15]. 
Other studies emphasize more the cyclical nature of 
dominant design selection with experimentation, radical 
innovation, or incremental innovation based on an exist-
ing dominant design as start situation. Platforms re-
search, on the other hand, does not specify such clear 
starting situations. An implicit assumption of the eco-
nomics perspective is that different sides of markets ex-
ist between whom the platform can mediate [1]. Engi-




Key distinction: Both fields have a focus on techno-
logical innovation. Dominant design research studies a 
technological design against the background of its prod-
uct class or industry. Platform studies focus mostly on 
actors (mostly the platform leader, but also comple-
mentors) within a platform ecosystem. Empirically, 
both streams rely on high-tech – dominant design re-
search is based in contexts such as semiconductors or 
automotive, whereas platforms research mostly draws 
on ICT contexts. Dominant design research is specific 
regarding the start situation, assuming alternative tech-
nological designs, radical innovation, or an existing 
dominant design, while a modular architecture is the 
starting situation of a platform.  
5. Discussion and research agenda 
The analysis of dominant designs and platforms 
based on the cause-mechanism-output framework sug-
gests that these streams differ most prominently in their 
causes and underlying mechanisms. Regarding the posi-
tioning of the fields, the analysis showed that empirical 
contexts, as well as units of analysis and levels of anal-
ysis distinguish the fields. At the same time, these dif-
ferences offer potential complementarities.  
First, regarding causes, the most significant differ-
ence lies in how these phenomena come into being: 
dominant designs emerge, while platforms result from 
managerial action. Platforms know a central actor, 
called platform leader or platform owner, whereas dom-
inant designs are largely non-proprietary, or, to put it 
differently, emerge as a result of the joint actions by 
many different firms. Dominant designs often emerge in 
response to radical innovation and complete an era of 
ferment. In contrast, little is known on what causes plat-
forms. We expect the following directions for future re-
search: Why and under what conditions are platforms 
formed? In what way can the literature on dominant de-
signs explain the emergence of a dominant platform?  
Second, dominant design and platform research dif-
fer in the mechanisms that are at play. Dominant designs 
know one primary mechanism, namely the selection 
process. The baseline is that a dominant design emerges 
out of demand-driven competition in a set of related yet 
different application contexts, each of which sets 
slightly different requirements (the dominant design of 
an airplane is used in very different ranges and for pas-
senger and freight transport). Platform research can be 
divided into two types of mechanisms: mechanisms lead 
to the dominance of platforms, and platform-internal co-
ordination mechanisms that coordinate all involved or-
ganizations. The former is a mixture of direct and indi-
rect network effects, which overlap with dominant de-
sign selection. The latter can be subsumed under plat-
form governance which relates to governance outside of 
managerial hierarchies. Next to different kinds of mech-
anisms, it is also evident that the fields differ in duration 
or timespan of mechanisms. Based on the technology 
cycle, dominant design thinking acknowledges the 
come and go of successive dominant designs. This cy-
clical nature is foreign to platforms thinking which fre-
quently is interested in reaching and maintaining one 
platform’s dominance, while the more cross-sectional 
actor-centric perspective is alien to the dominant de-
signs thinking. The dominant design perspective is more 
longitudinal whereas the platforms perspective is more 
snapshot-like.  
In this respect, we see promising research opportu-
nities at the intersection of the long-term evolutionary 
perspective with the cross-sectional, actor centric view. 
The cyclical perspective related to the technology cycle 
that is so common in dominant designs research may 
lead to new insights in the domain of platforms. For ex-
ample: Is the technology cycle inherent in dominant de-
sign thinking applicable in the context of platforms? We 
also encourage to study long-term research how systems 
of complementary products and services in one platform 
do jointly evolve over time. 
For platform managers, it may be especially relevant 
to relate platform design to different stages of the tech-
nology cycle, such as: How does the role and nature of 
platform design vary across the stages of the technology 
cycle? Studying platforms through a cyclic lens may re-
quire a discussion on levels of analysis at which the 
technology cycle is applied. As the analysis regarding 
position revealed, both streams may be complementary 
on this aspect. Hence: On which level of analysis, such 
as industry, platform, complement, or focal product, is 
the technology cycle applicable, and how does it relate 
to platform design ? We expect distinct research oppor-
tunities on different levels. For example, on industry-
level, one may explore the dynamics of platform ena-
bling or platform providing technologies. For instance, 
are platforms based on pre-paradigmatic enabling tech-
nologies such as block chain more ore less fragile than 
their counterparts based on paradigmatic technologies? 
As Evans and Schmalensee [62] note, it may be hard to 
imagine that currently very competitive platforms such 
as Google or Facebook are subjected to a cyclical pat-
tern and may be eventually overturned. But anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this is possible, and that platform 
dominance can be at least successive (e.g., Myspace out-
competed Friendster and later lost to Facebook). To-
day’s platforms my come under threat by distributed 
platforms relying on blockchain technology [63]. Two- 
or multi-sided markets may depend on the technology 
cycle of the focal product that is transacted on their plat-
form. For instance, used car sale platforms such as mo-
bile.de or autotrader.com may depend on the transition 
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to powertrains other than internal combustion, with im-
plications for platform design and management. At the 
complement level, for example, it may help explain the 
emergence of killer apps 
Moreover, recent reviews have focused on indirect 
network effects in the emergence and growth of plat-
forms, concluding that the complementor perspective is 
underdeveloped [e.g., 50], and calling for more attention 
to specific complementary product configurations and 
mixes [64]. We think that platform research might ben-
efit from a fundamental role of network effects in plat-
form formation, similar to the discussion that Gallagher 
[8] has sparked in the field of dominant design. Gal-
lagher argues that dominant design selection is largely 
driven by order-of-magnitude advances in the price-per-
formance-ratio. Network effects may also drive its se-
lection but are not necessary. For example, in 2013, 
Google acquired the mapping service Waze, which of-
fers largely similar services, except for much stronger 
user engagement and a culture of mutual helping by re-
porting accidents, slowdowns, and the like [65]. Hence: 
To what extent is platform formation driven by direct 
network effects? When do direct network effects drive 
platform formation, when is it indirect network effects? 
As Gallagher [8] argues, a design can be dominant 
simply because it is the better design. Are there in-
stances where platform success is wrongly ascribed to 
network effects when it is driven by the price-perfor-
mance-ratio?  
Third, the studied empirical phenomenon is not ex-
actly the same. Dominant design research focusses 
mostly on standalone complex product architectures in 
high-tech industries such as semiconductors or automo-
tive, whereas platforms research applies a more sys-
temic perspective, predominantly based in ICT. Sys-
temic approaches to studying innovation such as plat-
form ecosystems (but also innovation systems) often 
suffer from ambiguities in defining the boundary be-
tween system and environment [66, 67]. This highlights 
the idea that over time both the platform and the envi-
ronment jointly evolve. The focus on dominant designs 
in a product class based on arbitrary thresholds forgoes 
the complexity arising from connections between organ-
izations but comes at the expense of additional insight. 
Nevertheless, we suspect that the analytical clarity of 
this simplification (dominant design in a product class) 
may help sharpen the boundaries of platform (ecosys-
tem) studies. The other way round, as products are be-
coming increasingly complex and interconnected [68], 
it seems inappropriate to bypass the systemic compo-
nent of technological innovation. This is not to blame 
dominant design scholars – many central studies in this 
field were authored long before the widespread adoption 
of computers, let alone the internet (see Table 1).  
6. Conclusion 
This study addressed the commonalities and differ-
ences of dominant designs and platforms. The domains 
are complementary in the way they deal with aspects of 
innovations. In the field of IS, innovations are most of-
ten technological, not standalone, emerging over time, 
and enabling a range of applications. Hence, IS may 
benefit from the integration of both complementary 
fields. 
The contributions are twofold: First, we have devel-
oped a framework tailored to the comparison of con-
cepts. It combines aspects from several prior approaches 
into one framework. Using the framework showed that 
it serves as a useful protocol for reading and analyzing 
papers. The multitude of attributes delivers much mate-
rial for the review but requires the authors to make 
choices regarding which material to present. It hence 
provides structure during the review process, making 
that process more transparent without being too much of 
a constraint. Second, we applied the framework to com-
pare the concepts of dominant designs and platforms. 
We elaborated the differences and potential comple-
mentarities between dominant designs and platforms, 
presented as direction for future research. This review 
adds to a growing literature that intents to take stock, 
structure, and consolidate recent advances in manage-
ment research [1, 11, 50, 51, 57], and the comparison of 
structural metaphors [8, 69]. This is valuable to scholars 
and practitioners alike as it facilitates access to the liter-
ature and helps bridge the divide between practitioners 
and scholars.  
This study is not without limitations. Clarifying con-
cepts based on theoretical or scientific literature and de-
fining them as precisely as possible is, by nature, a pos-
itivist endeavor. Based on recent calls for more synthe-
sis in management research, we believe that his is both 
necessary and valuable to theory and practice. We think 
that interpretivist approaches may help understand the 
situated use of concepts by practitioners and may com-
plement studies similar to ours. As some treat dominant 
designs and de-facto-standards as synonyms [e.g., 6, 
55], we relied on past research [8, 70] for an elaboration 
of the differences between the two concepts. Neverthe-
less, the synonymous use of dominant designs and 
standards may have inferred with the boundaries of this 
study. Comparing dominant designs and platforms re-
quires identifying the fields’ core publications which 
has been done based on the number of citations as a 
(dis)qualifier. Relying on an absolute measure of rele-
vance (absolute number of citations) puts older contri-
butions at an advantage over most recent ones. We ad-
dressed some of this bias by considering all studies that 
ISI Web of Science classified as ‘highly-cited’ which 
has led to the inclusion of various more recent studies, 
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leading to a relatively balanced distribution of the in-
cluded study over time (by publication year).  
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